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Abstract
Feasible elimination procedures (Peleg, 1978) play a central role in con-
structing social choice functions which have the following property: in
the associated game form, for any preference profile there exists a strong
Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. In this paper we pro-
vide an axiomatic characterization of the social choice correspondence
resulting from applying feasible elimination procedures. The axioms are
anonymity, Maskin monotonicity, and independent blocking.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Nos. C70, D71
Keywords Feasible elimination procedure, anonymity, Maskin monotonicity, in-
dependent blocking, axiomatization
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
We consider the classical social choice model with finitely many voters who have
preferences – linear orderings – over a finite set of alternatives. A social choice
function assigns an alternative to every profile of preferences, and induces an
ordinal game in which every voter has the set of all preferences as strategy space,
and evaluates an alternative according to his true, sincere preference. The the-
orem of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) says that, for every social
choice function with range at least three and which is nondictatorial on this
range, there is a profile of sincere preferences which is not a Nash equilibrium
in this game. Equivalently, such a social choice function is not strategy-proof.
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Thus, since the only strategy-proof social choice functions are the dictatorial
ones, it follows that strategy-proofness is equivalent to every profile of sincere
preferences being an even strong Nash equilibrium. Peleg (1978) therefore con-
sidered the following weaker condition: for every profile of sincere preferences
there exists a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere alternative, i.e.,
the alternative assigned if the voters report sincerely. Social choice functions
having this property are called ESC (exactly and strongly consistent).
Thus, if an ESC social choice function is used, then it is at least plausible
that the sincere alternative results. An additional motivation for using an ESC
social choice function derives from the fact that the sincere preference profile
is not manipulable in the following sense. Suppose a coalition deviates, by not
reporting sincerely, such that all its members are better off by this deviation.
Then there is a deviation by the complement of that coalition such that at least
one member of the originally deviating coalition is not better off compared to
the sincere profile. In other words, by deviating from the sincere profile no
coalition can guarantee (i.e., independent of the outside agents) to make all its
members better off. See Peleg and Procaccia (2007), Peleg and Peters (2010,
Sect. 8.5), and in a related context Peleg and Peters (2015). In still other words,
ESC social choice functions not only admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting
in the sincere outcome but also make sincere voting itself a safe strategy for
voters and coalitions in situations where it is difficult to predict how others will
vote.
1.2 Motivation and objective
ESC social choice functions can be obtained by selecting alternatives resulting
from so-called feasible elimination procedures, introduced in Peleg (1978). A
fortiori, using feasible elimination procedures is the only way to construct ESC
social choice functions under three conditions, namely: the number of voters is
greater than or equal to the number of alternatives minus one, the social choice
function is anonymous, and it satisfies no veto power. The last condition says
that no single agent can exclude any alternative from being chosen. See Peleg
and Peters (2010), Sect. 10.5, which in turn is based on Holzman (1986). These
conditions are natural and thus, feasible elimination procedures are essential for
achieving this particular way of alleviating the consequences of the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite Theorem.
Feasible elimination procedures work as follows. Attach weights (natural
numbers) to the alternatives such that the sum of these weights is equal to
the number of voters plus one. Consider a preference profile and delete an
alternative x that is bottom ranked by at least as many voters as the weight
of x; also delete as many preferences from the profile, having x bottom ranked,
as the weight of x. Repeat this procedure for the reduced profile, until one
alternative is left. This alternative is called ‘maximal’ for the preference profile
under consideration. It does not have to be unique.
The objective of this paper is to provide an axiomatic characterization of the
social choice correspondence assigning the maximal alternatives to each prefer-
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ence profile. The axioms that we use are two general conditions: anonymity and
Maskin monotonicity; and a condition related to the blocking power of coali-
tions. Anonymity is clear, and Maskin monotonicity (Maskin, 1999) says that
if the position of a chosen alternative improves in the preference profile, then it
will still be chosen in the new profile. Maskin monotonicity is well-known as a
necessary condition for implementation.
A coalition can block a set of alternatives if by putting this set at the bottom
part of their preferences no assigned alternative will be in this set, whatever the
reported preferences of the outside voters. A coalition minimally blocks such a
set if no proper subcoalition can block it. The condition related to the block-
ing power of coalitions is called ‘independent blocking’. Its main implication is
that if two disjoint sets of alternatives are minimally blocked by two disjoint
coalitions, then the union of the two sets of alternatives is minimally blocked by
the union of those coalitions. The main result of the paper is that the axioms
of anonymity, Maskin monotonicity, and independent blocking characterize the
social choice correspondence assigning the maximal alternatives, i.e., the alter-
natives resulting from feasible elimination procedures. We also show that these
axioms are logically independent.
Section 2 presents preliminaries, and in Section 3 we state and prove the
characterization result. Section 4 concludes.
Notations The following basic notations are used throughout. For a set D, |D|
denotes the cardinality of D, P (D) the power set, i.e., the set of all subsets of
D, and P0(D) the set of all nonempty subsets of D.
2 Preliminaries
Let A be the set of m alternatives, m ≥ 2, and let N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2, be
the set of voters. Subsets of N are called coalitions. Let L be the set of all
preferences, i.e., complete, antisymmetric and transitive binary relations, on A.
Then LN is the set of all (preference) profiles. A social choice correspondence
(SCC) is a function H : LN → P0(A).
The main SCC of interest in this paper is based on so-called feasible elimi-
nation procedures. Informally, first, attach weights β(x) ∈ N to the alternatives
x ∈ A. Consider a preference profile and take an alternative x that is bot-
tom ranked at least β(x) times. Delete that alternative from the profile and
at the same time delete β(x) preferences where x is bottom ranked. Repeat
this procedure until one alternative remains, which happens under appropriate
conditions.
Formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 2.1. Assume that n+1 ≥ m and let β : A→ N satisfy∑x∈A β(x) =
n + 1. Let RN ∈ LN . A feasible elimination procedure (f.e.p.) for RN is a
sequence (x1, C1; . . . ;xm−1, Cm−1;xm) such that
1) A = {x1, . . . , xm},
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2) C1, . . . , Cm−1 are pairwise disjoint subsets of N and |Cj | = β(xj) for all
j = 1, . . . ,m− 1,
3) xkRixj for all j = 1, . . . ,m− 1, k = j + 1, . . . ,m, and i ∈ Cj .
It is not difficult to see that there exists always at least one f.e.p. under the
assumptions in the definition. Henceforth in this paper we assume n+1 ≥ m. An
alternative x isRN -maximal if there exists an f.e.p. (x1, C1; . . . ;xm−1, Cm−1;x).
We denote
Mβ(RN ) = {x ∈ A : x is RN -maximal}.
Thus, Mβ depends on the exogenously chosen weights β(x), x ∈ A, which
can be varied as long as
∑
x∈A β(x) = n+1. Note that it is not always possible
to choose all weights equal, so it is not always possible to achieve neutrality.
The importance of the SCC Mβ derives from the fact that every selection
from it produces an ESC social choice function, and that under some additional
but natural conditions, selecting fromMβ for some weight function β is the only
way to achieve ESC social choice functions. We refer to the Introduction of the
paper for more explanation.
3 Axiomatic characterization of M
LetH be an SCC. We first introduce some terminology and notations concerning
the blocking power of coalitions.
A coalition S ∈ P0(N) blocks a set B ∈ P0(A) at H if for any profile
QS ∈ LS for S such that xQi y for each x ∈ A \ B and y ∈ B, we have
H(QS , RN\S) ⊆ A \ B for all RN\S ∈ LN\S . Coalition S ∈ P0(N) minimally
blocks B at H if no proper nonempty subcoalition of S blocks B at H. If a
set B ∈ P0(A) is blocked by some coalition at H, then we define the blocking
coefficient bH(B) as the minimal size of such a coalition, hence
bH(B) = min{|S| : S ∈ P0(N) blocks B at H} .
Otherwise, we define bH(B) = n + 1. Note that, since H(RN ) 6= ∅ for all
RN ∈ LN by definition, no coalition blocks A, and thus bH(A) = n+ 1 always.
The choice of blocking coefficient n+ 1 for an unblocked set of alternatives will
have some consequences under the last axiom below, see also Remark 3.1. We
call bH : P0(A)→ {1, . . . , n+ 1} the blocking function of H.
We consider the following axioms on H.
Anonymity For all RN ∈ LN and for all permutations pi of N , H(R1, . . . ,
Rn) = H(Rpi(1), . . . , Rpi(n)).
Maskin monotonicity For all RN = (R1, . . . , Rn), QN = (Q1, . . . , Qn) ∈ LN ,
and x ∈ H(QN ), if xQiy implies xRiy for all y ∈ A and i ∈ N , then x ∈ H(RN ).
Independent blocking The blocking function bH is additive, i.e., bH(B1 ∪
B2) = bH(B1) + bH(B2) for all B1, B2 ∈ P0(A) with B1 ∩B2 = ∅.
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Anonymity needs no further explanation. Maskin monotonicity says that if
a chosen alternative does not gets worse in any one’s preference, then it remains
to be chosen. It is a necessary condition for implementation in Nash equilibrium
(Maskin, 1999).
Under anonymity, independent blocking implies for instance that if S1 min-
imally blocks B1 and S2 minimally blocks B2, and S1 and S2 as well as B1 and
B2 are disjoint, then S1 ∪ S2 minimally blocks B1 ∪B2.
Remark 3.1. By the choice bH(A) = n+ 1, independent blocking implies the
equivalence bH(B) = n+1⇔ B = A. It also implies that H is non-imposed, i.e.,
for every a ∈ A there is a profile RN ∈ LN such that H(RN ) = {a}. This can
be seen as follows. Suppose that there is some a ∈ A such that H(RN ) 6= {a}
for all RN ∈ LN . Then bH(A \ {a}) = n + 1, so independent blocking implies
bH({a}) = bH(A)− bH(A \ {a}) = 0, a contradiction.
The following theorem is the announced characterization of the social choice
correspondences Mβ .
Theorem 3.2. Let n+ 1 ≥ m and let H be an SCC. The following statements
are equivalent.
(i) H satisfies anonymity, Maskin monotonicity, and independent blocking.
(ii) There is a function β : A→ N with∑x∈A β(x) = n+1 such that H =Mβ.
In what follows we use the notation β(B) for
∑
x∈B β(x), where B ∈ P0(A).
In the proof of Theorem 3.2 we use the following lemmas.
Lemma 3.3. Let n+ 1 ≥ m and let β : A→ N such that ∑x∈A β(x) = n+ 1.
Let B ∈ P0(A) and S ∈ P0(N). Then S minimally blocks B at Mβ if and only
if |S| = β(B).
Proof. For the only-if statement, suppose that S minimally blocks B at Mβ .
Let QS ∈ LS such that xQi y for all i ∈ S, x ∈ A \ B and y ∈ B. Then
Mβ(QS , RN\S) ⊆ A \B for all RN\S ∈ LN\S . Consider, in particular, a profile
R˜N\S such that xR˜iy for all x ∈ B, y ∈ A \ B, and i ∈ N \ S. For an f.e.p.
(x1, C1; . . . ;xm−1, Cm−1;xm) for (QS , R˜N\S) we have xm ∈ Mβ(QS , R˜N\S) ⊆
A \ B and therefore B ⊆ {x1, . . . , xm−1}. By definition of R˜N\S we must
have Cj ⊆ S for every j ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1} with xj ∈ B. Therefore, |S| ≥∑
j∈{1,...,m−1}:xj∈B |Cj | = β(B). Now consider any coalition T ⊆ S such that
|T | = β(B) and a profile PT ∈ LT such that xP iy for all x ∈ A \B and y ∈ B.
Then |N \ T | = n− β(B) = β(A \B)− 1 < β(A \B), so that any f.e.p. for any
(PT , RN\T ) results in an alternative of A \ B. Hence, T blocks B at Mβ , so
that T = S by minimality of S. Hence, |S| = β(B).
For the if-statement, if |S| = β(B) then by the preceding argument S blocks
B at Mβ . For any T ⊆ S to block B we need |T | ≥ β(B) by the same argument
as in the first part of the proof. Hence, S minimally blocks B at Mβ . ¤
The next lemma is crucial for proving the implication (i) ⇒ (ii) in Theo-
rem 3.2. It is a reformulation of an existing result.
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Lemma 3.4. Let n+ 1 ≥ m and let β : A→ N such that ∑x∈A β(x) = n+ 1.
Let x ∈ A and RN ∈ LN . The following statements are equivalent.
(i) x ∈Mβ(RN ).
(ii) There are no S ∈ P0(N) and B ∈ P0(A) such that |S| ≥ β(A \ B),
x ∈ A \B, and y Ri x for all i ∈ S and y ∈ B.
Proof. This is Theorem 9.3.6 in Peleg and Peters (2010). ¤
We are now sufficiently equipped to prove the main result of the paper.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. We first prove the implication (ii)⇒ (i).
Let β : A → N such that ∑x∈A β(x) = n + 1. Clearly, Mβ is anonymous.
For Maskin monotonicity of Mβ , see Remark 9.3.7 in Peleg and Peters (2010).
From Lemma 3.3 it follows that the blocking function b = bMβ of Mβ is β, i.e.,
b(B) = β(B) for all B ∈ P0(A), and independent blocking follows since β is
additive.
For the implication (i)⇒ (ii), letH satisfy the three axioms. Define β : A→
N by β(x) = bH(x) for all x ∈ A. Then by independent blocking,
∑
x∈A β(x) =
n+ 1, so Mβ is well-defined. We prove that H =Mβ . Let RN ∈ LN .
First, let x ∈Mβ(RN ). Then there exists an f.e.p. (x1, C1; . . . ;xm−1, Cm−1;
x) with respect to RN . Let now QN be the profile that is obtained from RN
by lowering xj to the bottom of Ri for all i ∈ Cj and for j = 1, . . . ,m − 1,
and leaving everything else intact. By the definition of blocking coefficients,
H(QN ) ⊆ A \ {xj} for all j = 1, . . . ,m − 1, so that H(QN ) = {x}. Finally,
since xRixj for all i ∈ Cj and j = 1, . . . ,m − 1 (by the third condition in
Definition 2.1), and since H is Maskin monotonic, x ∈ H(RN ).
Second, let x ∈ H(RN ). Suppose there are S ∈ P0(N) and B ∈ P0(A) as in
(ii) of Lemma 3.4, i.e., |S| ≥ β(A \B), x ∈ A \B, and y Ri x for all y ∈ B. For
each i ∈ S let Qi ∈ L be a preference with yQiz ⇔ yRiz for all y, z ∈ A \ B
and with yQiz for all y ∈ B and z ∈ A \B. Since |S| ≥ β(A \B) = bH(A \B),
by anonymity we have that S blocks A \ B at H, so that x /∈ H(QS , RN\S).
On the other hand, since x ∈ H(RN ) and yRix for all i ∈ S and y ∈ B,
Maskin monotonicity of H implies x ∈ H(QS , RN\S), a contradiction. Hence,
x ∈Mβ(RN ) by Lemma 3.4. ¤
We finally show that the three axioms in Theorem 3.2 are logically indepen-
dent, by exhibiting three examples.
Example 3.5. Let A = {x, y} and let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Define the SCC H as
follows. Let RN ∈ LN . If R1 = R2 = yx (i.e., both 1 and 2 prefer y above
x) then H(RN ) = {y}. If R2 = R3 = R4 = xy then H(RN ) = {x}. In all
other cases, H(RN ) = {x, y}. Then H is Maskin monotonic and independently
blocking: bH(x) + bH(y) = 3 + 2 = 5 = bH(A). However, H is not anonymous.
Example 3.6. It is not difficult to see that there exist anonymous selections
from Mβ : e.g., take Q ∈ L and let F (RN ) be the alternative of Mβ(RN ) that
is maximal according to Q. Such a selection is still independently blocking.
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However, it cannot be Maskin monotonic (if m ≥ 3) because then by Muller
and Satterthwaite (1977) it would be dictatorial.
Example 3.7. The Pareto correspondence P assigns to each profile RN the
set {x ∈ A : there is no y ∈ A with yP ix for all i ∈ N}. It is anonymous and
Maskin monotonic, but it is not independently blocking: bP (B) = n for every
B ∈ P0(A), B 6= A.
4 Conclusion
For any sincere preference profile, in the game associated with an exactly and
strongly consistent social choice function there exists always a strong Nash equi-
librium resulting in the sincere outcome. Also, for such a social choice function,
sincere voting itself is a safe strategy in the sense that a coalition deviating
from it is not guaranteed a better outcome. In order to construct exactly and
strongly consistent social choice functions feasible elimination procedures play
a central role. In this paper, we have provided an axiomatic characterization of
the social choice correspondence that assigns maximal alternatives, i.e., alterna-
tives resulting from feasible elimination procedures. The proof of our axiomatic
characterization depends to an important extent on earlier results, in particular
on Theorem 9.3.6 in Peleg and Peters (2010), which, in turn, goes back to an
unpublished result of Polishchuk (1978). This theorem is phrased in terms of
an effectivity function and its core.
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